| |
|
 |
|
|
|
| |
| The politics-economics-ethics continuum revisited | Bart Engelen *
Research Assistant of the Fund for Scientific Research ? Flanders (Belgium), full-time PhD student at the Centre for Economics and Ethics of the K.U.Leuven
E-mail: bart.engelen@econ.kuleuven.be
| Abstract
The diverse social sciences are often defined using an exclusively instrumental framework. In this respect, Prof. Liviu Drugus recently suggested to define politics as being concerned about establishing ends, economics as the study of the combination and consumption of means in order to attain those ends and ethics as the study of the convergence of these dimensions. After summarizing the arguments in favor of this instrumental framework, this article argues that it runs into several problems and must therefore be complemented by the notions of procedural and expressive rationality. While the first refers to the importance of socially shared institutions, rules and norms in explaining behavior, the second emphasizes that an individual?s choices are often an expression of his deeply rooted identity. Because these aspects systematically recur in politics, economics and ethics, this article calls for a new conception of the politics-economics-ethics continuum and tries to open up possibilities for truly interdisciplinary research within the social sciences.
Key words: instrumental, procedural and expressive rationality
The social sciences are often defined using only the instrumental framework of means and ends. Politics is characterized as the process of establishing and pursuing ends in function of the existing means. Economics is considered to be the study of the combination and consumption of means in order to attain specific ends. Ethics can be regarded as the study of the fitting and matching between the political and economic dimension. In the first section of this article, I offer some arguments why such a view of what one might call the "politics-economics-ethics continuum" (Drugus 2003a) is worthy of attention. In the second section, I attempt to show that there are limitations on this use of the instrumental framework to understand what politics, economics and ethics are really all about. In the third section, I propose two alternative approaches that complement this ends-means methodology (Drugus 2003b), but can not be reduced to it. This leads to a new way of looking at the politics-economics-ethics continuum.
1. Why define politics, economics
and ethics only by ends and means?
There is a certain rationale for using an instrumental framework to understand the different dimensions of the way people interact in everyday social life.
1.1. Why define politics only by ends and means?
As members of a society, citizens collectively formulate what they consider to be desirable goals or ends. This element is typical of political activities, in which people try to answer the question which state of the world is the best one, given their current means and possibilities. Politicians are engaged in establishing which ends are to be realized by referring to the public interest (the overall end every citizen is concerned with) or by aggregating private preferences (the individual ends of each member of the political community). The political dimension is thus about evaluating and ranking competing ends which are all valuable, but can not be realized at the same time. In doing so, the available time span is usually so short that political actors have to consider the available means as given while making their decisions. Whether the members of a society want to use their resources to build a bridge or a public pool is, for example, a distinctively political issue.
Politicians facing elections tend to focus on the goals they want to achieve and in what ways these correspond to the needs and preferences of the citizens. The main political issue thus seems to be what it is exactly that citizens want (more jobs, more social security, less taxes, et cetera). On a more fundamental and constitutional level, people have to decide how to balance values like equality, liberty, human rights, safety, et cetera. In this light, it seems useful to define politics as the study of how people establish what their common ends are and ought to be. This view seems present in one way or another in almost every modern conception of political philosophy.
Of course, there are substantial differences. Some theorists argue that there is one common good or overall end on which there is unanimous agreement. Among such ?monists? are communitarians (the general will) and utilitarians (well-being). Other theorists claim that there are many aspects of the good which have to be taken into account and have to be weighed against each other. Among such ?pluralists? are liberals like John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin (rights), but also authors like Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum (capabilities). A final group of authors argues that politics is a collective enterprise of individuals in search of their own goals. Among these theorists are ?contractarians? like James Buchanan and Thomas Scanlon, but also ?libertarians? like Robert Nozick.
1.2. Why define economics only by ends and means?
After going through the political procedure of determining what they want, people can be concerned about how to employ the available means in order to realize these goals. This corresponds to one of the most frequently cited definitions of economics as "the science which studies human behavior as a relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses" (Robbins 1935: 85). This definition of economics as the science of the allocation of scarce resources among alternative desirable ends also returns in the work of Max Weber (Weber 1949: 69-70). It immediately implies that economists do not meddle with the decision what ends are to be pursued. After the political process has determined the desired ends, the economist can analyze how to allocate resources in order to achieve them.
This definition is a very broad one. In lots of aspects of my private life I want to satisfy ends of varying importance with scarce means to do so (time, money, et cetera). Suppose I want to look nice at a wedding. With this goal in mind, I set out to buy clothes with the limited amount of money that is available to me. The same process is also omnipresent at the social level. In the process of building a public pool (which is supposedly preferred to a bridge by a majority of the citizens), one has to analyze how to employ the available means. The main economic question therefore is how to best use the available means to realize certain ends. The bulk of modern-day macro-economics analyzes in which ways different factors affect the economy and evaluates which combination of them is expected to realize the politically determined goals in the most effective way. For example, in order to create more jobs, does one has to eliminate tariffs or impose extra safeguard measures? All these questions and decisions are clearly economic by nature and are indeed about the combination and consumption of means in order to attain certain ends.
1.3. Why define ethics only by ends and means?
As I have shown, it is possible to define ethics as the study of the fitting and matching of the economic and the political dimension. The rationale for this description can be shown ?ex negativo?. It is certainly true that problems arise in situations where the economic and political dimensions do not converge. This can be the case if some minority group is able to monopolize the means available to society (economics) and use them in order to fulfill their private interests instead of the democratically determined public interest (politics). Ethics, which is first and foremost a branch of practical philosophy, shows that politics and economics can not function in separation. It does not help to know how to achieve certain goals (economics) if one can not distinguish better from worse goals (politics). Nor is it useful to set out to attain a better state of affairs (politics) that happens to be impossible (economics). Without the combination of these considerations, policy discussion, and in its wake ethics, is meaningless.
2. The instrumental politics-economics-ethics continuum revisited
Although there is some plausibility in this usage of a purely instrumental vocabulary, I want to show that there are limitations to these definitions of politics, economics and ethics. In order to avoid misunderstanding, I want to abstract from the individual level and restrict the discussion to the social level (interaction between individuals in a community). The above definitions are obviously not really relevant in the study of individual behavior. If a person is looking at the content of his wallet when trying to decide what to buy with it, he is actually establishing and pursuing ends in function of the existing means, but the nature of his behavior is clearly economic and not political.
2.1. The instrumental definition of politics revisited
Defining politics as exclusively concerned with defining and ranking ends leaves out several essential characteristics of political activities. Politicians do not only decide which goal they want to realize, they also determine how to go about this. Since the weighing of competing ends always implies some evaluation of the available means, politics can not remain neutral towards the allocation of the latter. Politicians are as frequently engaged in chosing how to employ alternative means as they are in choosing between alternative ends. Furthermore, there is the fact that political decisions have a great impact on what kind of means will be available in the future. The Treasury of tomorrow (future available means) depends on the taxes that are collected today (current goals). The insight one gains from these considerations is that politics inevitably invades in the domain of economics, as these are instrumentally defined.
2.2. The instrumental definition of economics revisited
The border between politics and economics is even more blurred if one realizes that economics is often not as scientifically exact as the arguments above suggest. Modern-day positive economic analysis often remains indeterminate in finding the best way to employ means in order to attain specific ends. When, for example, politics indicates that the creation of jobs is the primary goal, economics is not able to offer a unique way of reaching this end: whether liberalizing the market or taking safeguard measures is the most effective way remains a matter for debate. Much depends on the state of the economy at hand, which is often so complex that economists are not able to make accurate predictions. It is obvious that there will be room for values (liberty versus right to income), ideologies (procedural libertarianism versus redistributive justice) and political pressures (of different interest groups) influencing the decision between the policy measures one can take to create jobs. Once again, one sees that a lot of economic decisions are inherently political in nature, in the instrumental sense of these terms.
I can also emphasize this by showing how economic concepts like efficiency and economic growth have become values and ends in themselves, since they are being taken into account at the political level (next to liberty, equality, rights, preferences, et cetera). By exclusively focusing on instrumental rationality, which I shall show to be only one of the possible conceptions of rationality, economists now believe this is inherently valuable. This should not be a surprising result. In studying the combination and consumption of means in order to attain specific ends, they have always urged that whatever end is to be pursued, it has to be done efficiently. From the insight that an economy grows as it becomes more efficient, they have promoted economic growth as the main end to be realized in political activities. However, as the negative impacts of excessive economic growth become clear (on the environment, for example), it is important to reaffirm that determining desirable ends remains the first step in economic analysis. Once economists incorporate this insight, they can join the public discussions on the desirability of the different ends in a more sensible way than insisting on one overarching end. Economists need to understand that their goals of economic growth and full employment do not necessarily make people better off. There has already been quite some progress at this level. A wide range of economic literature can be understood as trying to formulate which ends are to be realized in social life. This field, known as welfare economics, tries to construct a social welfare function by aggregating individual rankings of preferences. Economists consider this social welfare function to be the main guideline for public policy. In doing so, they really are dealing with ends rather than means. Just as I have shown how politics invades economics, this shows that economics also invades politics.
The border between economics and ethics is thus also much vaguer than their instrumental definitions suggest (Hausman & McPherson 1995). Many economists consider their science to be an objective, value-free enterprise. In their view, normative economics is nothing more than the application of positive economic insights to matters of public policy. This is overly simplifying, since economists often have to weigh several incompatible ends. Furthermore, they have to formulate their opinion in moral terms such as needs, rights or fairness. In this sense, economists can not be understood as giving purely technical advice, since moral issues are inevitably part of their analyses. By equating well-being with the satisfaction of given preferences, welfare economics is stating what is good and what is not and thus belongs to the domain of ethics.
2.3. The instrumental definition of ethics revisited
The definition of ethics as the study of the fitting and matching of the political dimension (what is to be done) and the economic dimension (in what way it is to be done) remains highly unsatisfactory as well. Ethics is traditionally defined as the search for the good life (individual ethics) or the good society (social ethics). Paul Ricoeur combines these aspects in his definition of ethics as "the vision of the ?good life?, with and for others, in just institutions" (Ric?ur 1990: 202) . This immediately implies that ethics is concerned with ends as much as it is with attuning ends and means. Indeed, the question which ends society should pursue has always been and is still the most important issue that moral philosophers are confronted with. Ethics has often been defined in terms of some general end (the good) towards which all human beings (should) strive. However, different ethical theories offer different interpretations of this end and thus propose different rankings of ends. Some give priority to liberty, while others emphasize social justice, equality or other basic human rights.
Ethics can and must be about means too. Even the finest and most noble goals can be realized with horrible means. In rejecting the view that the end sanctifies the means, one must allow ethical arguments to play a role in deciding which means one may or may not employ to realize certain goals. This way one can see that ethics inevitably invades into the domains of politics and economics in their instrumental sense.
3. Why not define politics, economics and ethics only by ends and means?
In the previous section, I have shown that there are several essential aspects of politics, economics and ethics which can be understood by employing an instrumental vocabulary in a way that runs counter to the definitions that were suggested initially.
1. Politics is not only concerned about ends, but also about means.
2. Economics is not only concerned about means, but also formulates its own ends.
3. Ethics is not only concerned about attuning ends and means, but also about ends and means in themselves.
Proponents of defining social sciences only by ends and means will not find these remarks troublesome, but feel strengthened in their attempt to do so. This way, they hope to get rid of the artificially created borders between the social sciences and create more interdisciplinary fields of research. Thus far, I have provided additional arguments in support of a politics-economics-ethics continuum, which can be studied from an encompassing and uniform instrumental perspective.
In this section, however, I want to transcend this instrumental framework and offer two alternative approaches to complement this view. Once again, I deal with the three dimensions separately, although it is important to see how my remarks are interconnected. I also argue that these broader perspectives provide theoretically more adequate and fruitful ways of analyzing the different dimensions of social life.
3.1. Why not define political theory only by ends and means?
Analyzing politics in a purely instrumental framework leads to a consequentialist and future-oriented point of view, in which political behavior is explained by referring to the ends people want to realize . However, many aspects of political behavior can not be analyzed in this way. Voting in elections, which is the most important political act in democratic regimes, can not be exclusively understood as an attempt by citizens to put their goals on the political agenda or to influence policy goals. The infamous "paradox of voting" (Blais 2000: 2) shows that citizens who are instrumentally motivated in this way will decide not to vote, since the chance of their vote being decisive in determining the political outcome is negligibly small.
To explain why so many people decide to vote, one has to refer to something else than the expected benefits of such an act. Research has shown that voting is often related to the experience of some kind of civic duty or social norm, according to which every good citizen in a democracy should vote (Blais 2000: 104-112). This can be related to the alternative frameworks of procedural and expressive rationality, which are irreducible to instrumental rationality (Hargreaves Heap 1989). Procedural rationality analyzes human actions as based upon socially shared procedures, rules and norms. It situates the individual in a social, institutional and cultural context and states that it behaves in accordance with this context. To explain political behavior, it shows how individuals are influenced by existing institutions and shared norms, which for example stipulate that voting is a good thing in a democracy. Expressive rationality analyzes the actions of individuals primarily as the expression of their personality. Choices are detached from the satisfaction of certain preferences and connected to the deeply rooted identity of the individual. In this sense, one?s decision to vote can not be explained without referring to the way he sees himself (for example, as being a good citizen).
Procedural and expressive rationality are strongly interconnected: socially shared procedures and codes enable people to express their personalities which are formed through socialization and internalization of norms and values. In this way, a much richer image of the individual emerges. People are not solitary beings, continually defining ends and calculating how best to employ means. They are human beings whose identity is strongly influenced by the context of people, institutions, norms and values in which they are situated. These insights show that the definition of politics as establishing and pursuing ends in function of the existing means is seriously incomplete, since it leaves out several essential aspects of political behavior (procedures, institutions, norms, values, duties, et cetera). To return to the act of voting, I think that an adequate explanation is not (simply) that citizens are attempting to establish which ends are to be pursued, but (also) that they are living up to the social expectations that arise from the institutions, norms and values stipulating what it is to be a good citizen in a democratic society.
3.2. Why not define economics only by ends and means?
The same remarks can be made in the domain of economics, which is much more than the study of the most efficient combination of means to attain certain ends. Economic behavior is often guided by procedural and expressive rationality in a way that is irreducible to the exclusively instrumental framework that draws too narrow a picture. In some of the recent literature, economists are starting to pay attention to these aspects of economic life. Herbert Simon?s model of bounded or procedural rationality emphasizes the way in which economic decisions are made in a context of existing norms, traditions and habits (Simon 1984). Because of the uncertainty inherent in economic life and the individual?s limited cognitive capacities to deal with this, people often rely on such socially shared procedures. Procedural rationality is a pervasive characteristic of lots of economic decisions. Firms and consumers typically use rules of thumb instead of continuously calculating what exactly is the best way to achieve their ends (Hargreaves Heap 1989: 148-152). By focusing on cost-benefit calculations, neoclassical economists have not paid enough attention to the importance of conventions, habits and institutions which shape individual beliefs and desires. Following Veblen, institutional economists have shown that every theory which ignores the central role of these elements is not apt to gain insight in the functioning of an economy, since they form the preconditions for its survival (Veblen 1909).
Some types of economic behavior can only be understood in terms of expressive rationality. To explain, for example, the creative actions of the entrepreneur who is not able to fully assess the costs and benefits ?ex ante?, one has to focus on character traits, intuition and judgment capacities instead of the calculations that are suggested by the instrumental definition of economics (Schumpeter 1934). Other types of typically economic behavior can be explained by using expressive rationality as complementary to instrumental rationality (Hargreaves Heap 1989: 160-163; Hargreaves Heap 2001: 105-109). Certain consumptive acts, such as buying clothes, are no longer primarily a means to a certain end, for example to protect oneself to rain and cold, but can be understood as an expression of one?s identity and as a non-verbal form of communication. It certainly is surprising that neoclassical economic theory is wholly incapable of incorporating such elements, although they definitely belong to its traditional domain of market behavior.
Once again, the boundaries between the disciplines are disappearing. By investigating more thoroughly the reasons people have for their actions, economists will inevitably move into the domain of ethics. Since moral norms have an immense impact on the personality of the individual and his private behavior, procedural and expressive rationality form necessary complements of the standard paradigm of instrumental rationality. By agreeing with the statement by Martin Hollis and Edward Nell that "economics is not what economists do but what they ought to do" (Hollis & Nell 1975: 180), I want to conclude by saying that economics is much more than the study of human action in terms of instrumental rationality.
3.3. Why not define ethics only by ends and means?
Ethics too should incorporate the non-instrumental frameworks of procedural and expressive rationality. Moral behavior can not be explained by referring only to the fitting and matching of means with ends. Ethics is traditionally about morals, which the Cambridge Advanced Learner?s Dictionary defines as "standards for good or bad character and behaviour". These standards are always embodied in social norms, habits, practices and traditions and are often interpreted and formalized in institutions and systems of positive law. These externalizations of morality provide individuals with important guiding principles helping them in becoming a good person. Just as someone who is trying to lead a good life would be lost without them, a moral philosopher would be lost without some insight in the concept of procedural rationality. Furthermore, such norms are often not consequentialist by nature (Elster 1989). Kant has shown that the ethical imperative is typically categorical and not hypothetical: you have to fulfill your duty, no matter what the consequences of your actions may be (Kant 1785: 69). Someone who is trying to lead a good life acts this way because he feels it is his duty to do so.
This deontological concept of a moral law to which I subject myself can be related to my notion of expressive rationality. I act morally, because I consider myself to be a good man. My duty can not be externally imposed, but must be found by my own practical reasoning. As a moral subject, I am completely autonomous in giving myself my own moral law (Kant 1785: 81-86). Once again, by referring to some deep sense of personal identity, one is able to understand what ethics is really about. Instead of analyzing how to converge ends and means, ethics is about the good life, which can not be fully understood in exclusively instrumental terms.
4. Epilogue
In conclusion, I would like to reflect on the abovementioned aim of transcending artificially created borders among the diverse disciplines in social sciences. In this respect, I consider the suggestions in this paper to be more fruitful than the initially proposed instrumental definitions. Instead of restricting one discipline to one aspect of social life (political theory to ends; economics to means and ethics to the attunement of ends and means), I have tried to show how the paradigms of instrumental, procedural and expressive rationality recur in the different study of human behavior. This opens up the possibility of a more unified social science, because it implies that man remains one in every aspect of life, although he can be analyzed from differing scientific perspectives. Man is at the same time a political creature (Wolff 1966) , as much as he is an economic one (Ingram 1988) and a moral one (Niebuhr 1932). Following Hans Morgenthau, I thus embrace "a pluralistic conception of human nature. Real man is a composite of "economic man", "political man", "moral man", "religious man", etc." (Morgenthau 1978: 14). Every one of these aspects focuses in some sense on specific elements of what it is to be human. Economics is the science which articulates the folk psychology all humans implicitly employ in their daily interactions with each other (preferences and expectations are formalized concepts for desires and beliefs). Political theory and ethics study distinctively human features, since "only man is able to overcome his most basic animal instincts (?) for the sake of higher, abstract principles and goals" (Fukuyama 1992: 18). This way, I hope to have suggested possible directions for the development of truly interdisciplinary research within the social sciences.
References
[1] Blais, A. (2000), To Vote or Not to Vote? The Merits and Limits of Rational Choice Theory, Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press
[2] Drugus, L. (2003a), Ethics and Ethical Behavior in Education and Health Care. A Postmodern View, in: Revista Romana de Bioetica (Romanian Journal of Bioethics), 1 (1), January-March 2003
[3] Drugus, L. (2003b), Ethics is Political Economics. Moral Behavior is Good Management.
Applying End-Means Methodology to Health (Care) Systems and to their Management, in: Revista Romana de Bioetica (Romanian Journal of Bioethics), 1 (3), July-September 2003
[4] Elster, J. (1989), Social Norms and Economic Theory, in: Journal of Economic Perspectives, 3, p. 99-117
[5] Hargreaves Heap, S. (1989), Rationality in Economics, Oxford, Blackwell
[6] Hargreaves Heap, S. (2001), Expressive Rationality: Is Self-Worth Just Another Kind of Preference?, in: MAKI, U. (ed.) (2001), The Economic World View. Studies in the Ontology of Economics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 98-113
[7] Hausman, D.M. & Mcpherson, M.S. (1995), Economics, Rationality, and Ethics, in: Hausman, D.M. (ed.) (1995), The Philosophy of Economics. An Anthology, 2nd ed., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 252-275
[8] Hollis, M. & Nell, E.J. (1975), Rational Economic Man: A Philosophical Critique of Neo-Classical Economics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press
[9] Ingram, J.K. (1888), A History of Political Economy, New York, Macmillan & Co, available online at: http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/~econ/ugcm/3ll3/index.html
[10] Kant, I. (1785), Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, translated by M.J. Gregor, in: Gregor, M.J. (ed.) (1996), Practical Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 43-93
[11] Morgenthau, H.J. (1978), Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th ed. revised, New York, Knopf
[12] Mill, J.S. (1836), On the Definition of Political Economy; and on the Method of Investigation Proper to it, in: Mill, J.S., Robbins, L. & Robson, J.M. (1967), Essays on Economics and Society, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul
[13] Niebuhr, R. (1932), Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics, New York, Scribner
[14] Ric?ur, P. (1990), Soi-m?me comme un autre, Seuil, Paris
[15] Robbins, L. (1935), An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science, in: Hausman, D.M. (ed.) (1995), The Philosophy of Economics. An Anthology, 2nd ed., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 83-110
[16] Schumpeter, J.A. (1934), The Theory of Economic Development: An Inquiry into Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest, and the Business Cycle, Cambridge, Harvard University Press
[17] Simon, H.A. (1984), Reason in Human Affairs, Oxford, Basil Blackwell
[18] Veblen, T. (1909), The Limitation of Marginal Utility, in: Journal of Political Economy, 17, p. 620-636
[19] Weber, M. (1949), The Methodology of the Social Sciences, translated and edited by Shilz, E.A. & Finch, H.A., In: Hausman, D.M. (ed.) (1995), The Philosophy of Economics. An Anthology, 2nd ed., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 69-82
[20] Wolff, R.P. (ed.) (1966), Political Man and Social Man: Readings in Political Philosophy, New York, Random House
Notes
i. This is my own translation of the original quotation ?la visee de la ?vie bonne?, avec et pour autrui, dans des institutions justes?. In what follows, I shall neglect the individual level and focus on social ethics.
ii. This vague characterization leaves aside the question whether the relevant ends are formed by particular, private interests or by a more general, public interest.
iii. In his work called ?the Politics?, Aristotle already stated that ?man is by nature a political animal? (I, ii).
iv. Economic man was prominently present in the works of the great classical economists, such as Adam Smith and David Ricardo. It was first articulated in detail by John Stuart Mill (1836). But the term itself was used for the first time by Ingram (1888). Since then, the concept has been omnipresent in modern-day economics.
Internet Resources
www.philosophica.org/if/rec/bioethic.htm
www.reproductivecloning.net/open/transcript.html
www.christianity.com/partner/Article_Display_Page/
0,,PTID4211%7CCHID116414%7CCIID240123,00.html
Hyperleptinemia and cardiovascular diseases
The studies were carried out with the permission of the local Bioethic Committee. Results: Serum levels of leptin were significantly higher in the group ...
www.endocrine-abstracts.org/ea/0004/ea0004p43.htm
www.europaeische-akademie-aw.de/ pages/publikationen/newsletter/50.pdf
| |
|
|
|
|
|
PREVIOUS EDITIONS
|
| Vol. 2, no. 2 |
 |
| |
| Vol. 1, no. 2 |
 |
| |
| Vol. 1, no. 3
|
 |
| |
| Vol. 1, no. 4 |
 |
| |
|
|
| |
|
news
